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Abstract
The 1991-94 Haitian refugee crisis, and
the resulting intervention, brings to-
gether a number ofdifferent issues, in-
cluding refugee flows, human rights
concerns, UN Security Council action,
and the domestic politics and other di-
rect interests ofone ofthe great powers.
This article examines these factors and
the role they played in the eventual US-
led intervention. It concludes that the
perceived security aspects of the Hai-
tian refugees were the primary impetus
for the US action. However, human
rights and other humanitarian concerns
also played a significant, although am-
biguous, role, and the reaction on the
part of other states to the intervention
may prove to be precedential in legiti-
matingfuture interventionfor humani-
tarian purposes.
Précis
La crise des réfugiés haïtiens et l'inter-
vention suivante mélangent une série
des influences internationales: des mou-
vemen ts des réfugiés, des droi ts de la
personne, des actions du Conseil de Sé-
curité, tout en reflétant la politique in-
terne et d'autres intérêts du plus grand
pouvoir mondial. Cet article suit les tra-
ces de ces facteurs dans l'enjeu aboutis-
sant à l'intervention dont les É.-U. à la
tête. On conclut que la perception des
haïtiens comme risque sécuritaire par-
dessus tout incitait l'action interven-
tionniste. Les droits de la personne et
d'autres concernes humanitaires, ce-
pendant, ont joué un rôle significatif
bienue ambigu. Il est probable que les
réactions des autres étatsface àune telle
intervention dans l'avenir peuvent ser-
vir comme préalable dans le processus
de légitimation d'une intervention à ti-
tre humanitaire.
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The case of Haiti is particularly rel-
evant to the issue of refugees and inter-
vention because of the combination of
factors which brought together dra-
matie flows of refugees, human rights
concerns, Chapter VII action by the
Security Council, and the direct inter-
est of one of the great powers. The re-
action in the region to the way the final
outcome was achieved is also possibly
precedential.
On September 30, 1991, Jean
Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's first demo-
cratically elected president, was over-
thrown in a military coup. The
following three years saw the specta-
cle of boat loads of refugees trying to
make it to the United States and un-
even and ineffective reaction by the
OAS and UN, including the imposition
of sanctions. The OAS was the first in-
ternational body to take action in the
wake of the coup. The OAS called on
Aristide to be returned to power, de-
clared that the military government
would not be recognized, and recom-
mended sanctions. Less than two
weeks after the coup, the UN General
Assembly passed resolution 46/7 con-
demning the military takeover.
Throughout 1992, the OAS continued
to be the focus of international activity
aimed at returning Aristide to power.2
However, on December Il,1992, the
UN Secretary-General appointed a
special representative to deal with the
situation in Haiti. From that point on,
the UNbecame the focal point for deal-
ing with Haiti. As Acevedo argues, the
"shift to the UN forum was prompted,
at least in part, by the prospect of a
massive influx of refugees, which
drew high-Ievel attention to Haiti's
crisis in early January 1993, both from
the outgoing Bush administration and
from President-elect Bill Clinton."3 In
fact, the flow of refugees from Haiti
had become a signific~t policy issue
earlier in 1992. Haitians had been at-
tempting to reach the US by boat for
many years, and the US Coast Guard
routinely interdicted them. Between
1981 and 1990, 24,000 Haitians were
interdicted, while only six were al-
lowed to make asylum claims in the
US. Following the coup, the Coast
Guard began taking Haitians to the US
naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
where they were "screened in" to make
claims. Soon there were as many as
12,000 Haitians at the base. In May
1992, President Bush ordered the Coast
Guard to retum Haitians to Haiti with-
out evaluating their asylum claims. By
the end of 1992, more that 40,000 Hai-
tian had been interdicted, and during
thatyear 29,500 had been forcibly re-
turned.4 Only 54 Haitians were admit-
ted to the US as refugees.5 Thus, by the
time the UN became involved in a sig-
nificant way in December 1992, Haiti
was a major policy priority for one of
the biggest players in the UN.
During the presidential campaign
Bill Clirtton had stated that he would
reverse the policy of forced repatria-
tion. However, just before he was in-
augurated, he announced that he
would continue the policy of forced
return, and that only asylum claims
made in Haiti would be evaluated.6
The policy seemed to have its intended
effect-discouraging Haitians from
leaving Haiti and attempting to reach
the U5-and only 2,329 Haitian were
interdicted and returned in 1993.7
However, the conditions which
prompted the refugee exodus in the
first place were still in place. On April
4, 1994 exiled President Aristide gave
six month notice ending the 1981 ac-
cordbetween Haiti and the US thathad
allowed the repatriations. One month
later, President Clinton announced
that asylum claims would be proc-
essed on ships. A hunger strike by
Randall Robinson, Director of
TransAfrica, may have been partially
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responsible for Clinton's change of
policy.8 At the same time, the Haitian
military began to make it harder for
Haitians to leave the country. How-
ever, manywere able to leave, such that
24,917 Haitians were interdicted in
1994. At the same time, the US began
using Guantânamo Bay to process the
refugees. It also tried to get countries in
the region to allow processing and to
take in some of the refugees, at least
temporarily.lÜ
The Security Council passed its first
resolution on Haiti on June 16, 1993, a
year and a half after the coup. Resolu-
tion 841 Unoted with concern the inci-
dence of humanitarian crises,
including mass displacement of popu-
lation, becoming or aggravating
threats to international peace and se-
curity," and stated that it was:
Concerned that the persistence of
this situation contributed to a climate
of fear and persecution and eco-
nomic dislocation which could in-
crease the number of Haitians
seeking refuge in neighbouring
Member States and convinced that a
reversaI of this situation is needed to
prevent its negative repercussions on
the region ...
It found that the Haitian crisis "de-
fines a unique and exceptional situa-
tion warranting extraordinary
measures by the Security Council ...
[and] the continuation of this situation
threatens international peace and se-
curity." And, it implemented sanc-
tions against Haïti 'under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter. On August 27, reso-
lution 861 suspended the sanctions
when it seemed that the coup leaders
were implem.enting the Governor's Is-
land agreement which was to restore
Aristide to power. After a recently au-
thorized peacekeeping mission, the
United Nations Mission in Haiti
(UNMIH), was prevented from arriv-
ing in Haiti by the military and it was
clear that the de facto authorities were
not implementing the agreement in
good faith, resolution 872 of October
13, 1993 reinstated sanctions. On May
6, 1994, just two days before President
Clinton announced the policy of ship-
board processing of refugee claims, the
16
Security Council tightened sanctions
with resolution 917. Resolution 933 of
June 30 noted "the deteriorating hu-
manitarian situation in Haiti" and
"that the situation in Haiti continues to
constitute a threat to peace and secu-
rity in the region ... "
Itwasnot until resolution 940 ofJuly
31 which authorized military action to
reinstall Aristide that refugees were
mentioned specifically again. Resolu-
tion 940 stated that the Security Coun-
cil was:
Gravely concerned by the significant
further deterioration of the humani-
tarian situation in Haiti, in particular
the continuing escalation by the ille-
gal de facto regime of systematic vio-
lations ofcivilliberties, the desperate
plight of Haitian refugees...
It determined that "the situation in
Haiti continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security in the
region ... " The US heightened its
rhetoric regarding its will to intervene
over the ensuing month and a haIf and
US military ships were moved into
position off Haitian coast. Finally, a
settlemellt was reached with US repre-
sentatives on September 18 after the
military leadership found out that a US
invasion force was on its way and para-
troopers would land in a few hours. ll
Aristide returned to Haiti on October
15, 1994.12
Haiti is one of the clearest cases to
date of refugee flows leading to even-
tuaI intervention. Michael J. Glennon
argues that in resolution 940 the "Secu-
rity Council dealt with the refugee
problem not as a potential cross-bor-
der threat but, rather, in the context of
humanitarian considerations.,,13 It is
true that the resolution talked about
Uthe desperate plight of Haitian refu-
gees," whereas resolution 688 regard-
ing Iraq mentioned the umassive flow
of refugee towards and across interna-
tional frontiers and .... cross-border
incursions, which threaten interna-
tional peace and security in the region
..." Even in their role as helpless vic-
tims rather than a national security
threat, the very fact of the existence of
the refugees can be seen as constitut-
ing a basis for intervention. However,
placing resolution 940 within the con-
text of the previous three years makes
it very clear that it was the perception
of refugees as direct threats to interna-
tional peace and security that was be-
hind the eventual US-Ied intervention.
Certainly resolution 841 made the di-
rect connection between refugees and
security.
In addition, it was the US which ul-
timately undertook the intervention,
so it is its motives which are particu-
larly relevant. Between the September
1991 coup and August 1994, 67,493
Haitians were interdicted at sea, most
of these were forcibly repatriated. In
August, there were also approxi-
mately 14,000Haitians at Guantânamo
Bay.14 The US obviously had little con-
cern for them as refugees. Rather, they
were seen as a security threat, a mass of
humanity to be kept out of the country.
This feeling must have been reinforced
by the fact that by that time, a vigorous
debate had been going in the US about
immigration and significant anti-im-
migration sentiment was being ex-
pressed, particularly in Florida where
the Haitians would have landed if they
made it to the mainland. 15 Further, it is
noteworthy that the intervention came
only weeks before the agreement al-
lowing for the repatriation of Haitians
was to have expired. That this new
situation wotild have opened the inter-
dictions and repatriations up to more
challenge and would have made them
seem evenmore illegitimate musthave
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been on the minds of the US adminis-
tration. That the US continued to re-
turn Haitian refugees to a dangerous
situation, in violation of its interna-
tional commitments, and the fact that
it took so long to finally undertake its
intervention16 lead to the conclusion
that it was only the fact that it was re-
ceiving increasing international criti-
cism for its policies and that the
refugee crisis was intensifying and
heading for a new phase which led to
the activities on September 18, 1994.
However, beyond the US, sorne Latin
American countries, which were not
affected by the refugee crisis, sup-
ported force fui action to return
Aristide to power. This was by no
means a consensus view.17 However,
given previous attitudes in the region
which were adamantly opposed to any
kind of intervention, the Haitian crisis
may prove to be precedential in in-
creasing support for humanitarian in-
tervention:
But a precedent is being created that
could well rescue sorne future demo-
cratic government in Nicaragua or
Trinidad or even Paraguay from the
hands of its own soldiers-and, more
importantly, will deter the soldiers
from seizing power in many more
countries. It is not just an American
initiative, and it is not just business
as usual. 18
Michael Glennon argues, however,
that whatever precedent was set, it is
an ambiguous one at best:
In Haiti ... sovereignty lost. But sov-
ereignty's 10ss was not an unargu-
able gain for the community of
nations, because the community has
not adequately considered either the
rationale for continued ad hoc op-
portunism or the impact of its prec-
edents on future attempts to avoid
the piecemeal and move toward
principle.19
Thus, Haiti represents a case where the
perceived security aspects of refugee
flows were the main irnpetus behind
intervention, but where humanitarian
aspects may also play a significant, but
still ambiguous, role in creating a le-
gitimate basis for intervention in hu-
manitarian crises...
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